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Abstract:  Fines have long been seen as a method to ensure items are returned on time. Recently 
the need to charge patrons for not returning items has come into question. Many libraries have 
gone fine free to gain good will with their patrons and reallocate staff. To better determine the 
impact incremental fines have on patron behavior, we conducted an experimental study, charging 
one group fines and not charging the other. We found that there was not a statistically significant 
change in either fines accumulated or amount of material borrowed. The data suggests patrons 
keep the item for as long as they need it and return it when they are done. 
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Introduction 
For most librarians, the efficacy of daily fines1 is not in question. Fines motivate patrons 
where it matters: their bank account. The assumption is: if the patron knows they are being 
charged daily (or hourly) for overdue books, they are more likely to return them. While most 
librarians believe it, the true effect of fines on return rate has not been adequately researched. 
This experimental study examines how fines affect how long items are overdue, as well as the 
change in user habits when the threat of fines is removed. Our goal was to examine the 
effectiveness of fines on educated patrons.  
Several researchers have studied the impact of fines. Most of the research is case studies 
which compare fines generated before and after updating policies. While such studies are 
important, the participants in the compared groups are not the same when research is done over a 
period of years.  As the subjects are not the same, it is a significant limit to the findings. Our 
study is designed to minimize the difference in participant groups. 
Literature Review 
 Libraries have many reasons for implementing fines. Researchers found that controlling 
inventory, creating revenue, and teaching patrons responsibility are the major reasons to charge 
patrons for late material (Adomi, 2003, Yau Ching 2005, Mosley, 2004). The same reasoning has 
also been debated. Mosley (2004) described the costs of charging fines in staff labor, training 
patrons and staff on policy and procedure, and in the physical space needed to maintain 
paperwork. Paired with declining circulation numbers, the author challenged the belief that fines 
are creating revenue. She also questioned the need to control decreasing inventory as librarians 
                                                 
1 For this paper fines are incremental charges assessed hourly or daily to a user who has not brought back an item by 
its due date/time as a method of motivation or penalty. This is separate from processing fees or replacement charges 
assessed to fund the replacement of a long unreturned item or additional staff handling time. 
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weed collections and purchase online content. The argument to teach patrons responsibility is 
debated.  Mitchell and Smith (2005) argued that punishing patrons to make them better 
caretakers of library material is ineffective at best and unethical at worst. Patrons have incurred 
real world impacts from not returning material, including being unable to receive transcripts 
required to apply to jobs or graduate programs, loss of borrowing privileges from fines accrued 
while a minor, even prison sentences (Mitchell & Smith, 2005, "Serious about overdues", 1998). 
Most of the research around fines is on the impact of going fine-free, with little study on 
the effectiveness of fines in getting material returned on time. Libraries who went fine-free are 
discussed at length below. Studies of the impact of fines have been described by Shontz (1999). 
He studied returns over multiple years and found that there was "some effect" on return rate for 
fined books. The variance in the sample and other mitigating factors are a limit to the study. 
Surrounding the effectiveness of fines is the unfounded assumption that patrons are familiar with 
their library's policies. Yau Ching (2005) argued that circulation employees should be more 
active in user education so patrons are aware of the borrowing policy before they generate fines. 
Considering the issues that surround fines, some libraries have decided to eliminate charging 
patrons. 
Libraries that have eliminated fines  
The College of William & Mary; Brigham Young University; New York University 
(NYU); Eastern Kentucky University (EKU); Vancouver Island University; and Texas A&M 
University have all eliminated daily fines as part of a reassessment of circulation policies (Boyce 
2014, Wilson 2014, Rupp, Sweetman and Perry 2010, G. Mitchell 2000, Reed, Blackburn and 
Sifton 2014, Mosley 2004). As each of these libraries made other changes concurrently with 
eliminating fines, it is not possible to say with certainty which of the changes, both positive and 
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negative, could be attributed to eliminating fines. All libraries reported that their changes were, 
overall, positive, but there were also drawbacks observed.  
NYU experienced a 33% decline in fine revenue generated, despite increasing reserve 
fines and billing fees to compensate for the loss of daily fine payments. They also saw a small 
increase in number of overdue books even though loan periods had been extended. However, 
"the number of books that went into a billed-as-lost status dropped 65%" in the first year of using 
the revised policies (Rupp et al. 2010, p. 168). While more books were slightly overdue, many 
fewer were kept until they were severely overdue. Simultaneously with eliminating fines, NYU 
also increased the number and frequency of overdue notices, which may explain this beneficial 
change.  
William and Mary was able to reallocate a substantial portion of the position formerly 
dedicated to billing after eliminating fines (Boyce 2014). Since they simultaneously extended 
undergraduate loan periods, many fewer books were billed as lost, which required a manual 
process. Part of their decision was due to the fact that the amount of revenue generated by fines 
had been less than the cost in staffing to collect those fines. Gregory Mitchell (2000) stated that 
this was also true at EKU, but neither author went into detail about how the cost of collecting 
fines was calculated. Texas A&M also found they were spending four times more to collect fines 
than they were gaining by charging them (Mosely, 2004). Mosely’s calculations took into 
account all of the staff time involved with collecting fines including filing, cash handling, 
processing appeals, explaining fines to patrons, and time spent by university staff at financial 
offices outside of the library. Mosely points out that a library eliminating fines and saving staff 
time will still have a decline in revenue unless staff is laid off. She also warns that whatever 
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processes replace the fine system "must not be so cumbersome that they consume all of the 
recovered staff resources" (p. 15). 
Gregory Mitchell (2000) provided statistics regarding the overdue and lost book rates 
before and after fines were eliminated at EKU and showed in the year after fines were 
eliminated, more books became overdue. The amount of money collected for lost and billed 
books nearly doubled as well. However, the rate of lost books for which replacement fees were 
paid per circulation transaction was only .129%, approximately 55 books during the year after 
fines were eliminated. He writes that both patrons and staff were pleased with the change.  
Vancouver Island University chose to eliminate fines partially because with decreasing 
print circulation, fine revenue was no longer sufficient to justify the cost in staff time and patron 
goodwill (Reed et al. 2014). It was also an effort to encourage more use of the print collection, 
which sadly was not among the observable results. In the year after fines were eliminated, a 
smaller percentage of checked out books became overdue. They also chose to forgive any fines 
that had previously been accrued, which anecdotally led to many happy patrons returning to use 
the library after avoiding it (Reed et al. 2014).   
When Texas A&M eliminated fines for main collection items, they designed a system 
that would prompt users to return books without imposing a financial penalty except for "the 
most irresponsible of users" (Mosely 2004, p. 17). A lost book processing fee of two dollars is 
added after 45 days overdue, but is forgiven if the books are renewed, and this can be an unseen 
renewal (users do not need to bring the books to the library). Until books are returned or 
renewed, library privileges are also blocked. If books are not returned within 60 days, the 
replacement cost is also charged to the account. At this point, books must be brought in person to 
be renewed, a conscious decision to add an inconvenience as a punishment to replace the 
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financial punishment of fines. In this new system, all fees are forgiven if the books are returned 
within 90 days of when they became overdue. The results of the change were positive; the 
addition of the small lost book fee got patrons' attention and they were motivated to return or 
renew, while forgiving the fee in the majority of cases meant that there was still an improvement 
in patron satisfaction and staff time was saved.  
While all six of the libraries discussed above have eliminated daily fines for their main 
circulating collections, at least five (NYU, VIU, BYU, William and Mary, and Texas A&M) 
retain fines for reserve items and/or recalled items (Rupp et al. 2010, Reed et al. 2014, Wilson 
2014, Boyce 2014, Mosely 2004). The sixth, EKU, did not mention any remaining fines after the 
policy revision (G. Mitchell 2000).  
Patron attitudes towards fines  
Unsurprisingly, patrons do not like to be charged fines. Edewor (2010) found that 
university staff, especially, resented paying their employer, while Davies and Sen (2014) found 
that students were unhappy with fines charged by their British public university as tuition rates 
increased. Students reported negative emotions when they are fined, but also reported that if they 
truly needed the book, a fine, while unpleasant, would not convince them to return it (Davies and 
Sen 2014). Mosely (2004) notes that in situations when a library fee appears as a line item on 
students' tuition bills, they may feel that being charged additional late fines is unjust and expect 
more lenience regarding late books. While patrons dislike paying fines, they frequently support 
the policy of charging fines (Edewor 2010, Adomi 2003, Davies and Sen 2014, Bhatt 2011). 
When surveyed, more patrons than not agree that fines are necessary to ensure others use the 
library responsibly.  
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Incentives to return books on time  
When Brigham Young University eliminated fines, they also looked at loan periods and 
concluded that increasing undergraduate loan periods would decrease the number of renewals 
needed, reducing the number of forgotten renewals and fines. Another concern was ensuring 
other patrons have access to checked out titles. The library began sending notices to any patron 
who had a book another patron requested, without placing a recall with a new due date. 
Informing the patron that someone else wants the book sometimes leads them to return it, and if 
they did not, an interlibrary loan request was placed (Wilson, Frazier, and Harter 2015).  
Another possibility is discussed by Sung and Tolppanen (2013), who compared book 
return rates at their respective universities. One offers a 10-day grace period, while the other 
offers no grace period. The grace period reduces the workload involved in collecting small fines 
while the fine still provides an incentive for patrons to return books. The university with the 
grace period did not have a statistically significant difference in on-time returns compared with 
the university without a grace period.  
The same paper also compared graduate student return rates before daily fines were 
imposed and afterwards, and found that the fine did not make a statistically significant 
difference. Both before and after the daily fine was added, a billing fee was charged for severely 
overdue books, and the authors speculate that that was sufficient incentive on its own. Finally, 
they also compared faculty behavior at the two universities, one which had no penalties for 
faculty for any book which was eventually returned, one which charged both daily fines and, 
eventually, a billing fee. Faculty at the no-penalty school were more delinquent, but it was not 
possible to say whether this was due to the daily fines or the billing fee (Sung and Tolppanen 
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2013). Wilson (2014) and Rupp, Sweetman, and Perry (2010) also argue that a billing fee for 
severely overdue books is a sufficient replacement for a daily fine.  
Another strong incentive available to academic libraries is the ability to prevent students 
from registering for the next semester's classes, graduating, or receiving transcripts until books 
have been either returned or paid for. This will not prevent patrons from keeping books 
somewhat longer than their due dates, but it does provide some protection for the collection. G. 
Mitchell writes that the Eastern Kentucky University Libraries decided to change blocking 
patrons from a last resort to the first line of defense, and eliminated fines for books until they are 
considered "seriously overdue" (p. 19) and billed, at which point library privileges are also 
blocked. Reed, Blackburn, and Sifton (2014) and Mosely (2004) also indicate that blocking 
patrons is part of their fine-free policies.  
Some libraries have gone to methods that are not punitive to encourage timely returns. 
One library attempted to encourage on-time book return by offering a reward, rather than a 
punishment (W. B. Mitchell and Smith 2005). However, after several years of offering a chance 
to win a gift card to any student who checked out books and returned them all on time, there was 
no observable effect on book return rates. Sifton (2009) argues for the abolition of fines in public 
libraries; however, if this is not possible, he suggests ways to reduce the burden of fines, such as 
offering "food for fines" canned good drives or reduced or waived fines to specific groups, such 
as senior citizens. Yau Ching (2005) wrote that user education can encourage better behavior 
from patrons as well as ensure that users will feel less upset with the library when consequences 
such as fines do arise. Two areas identified as causing friction with patrons are recalls and late 
renewals (renewing a book that is already late sometimes generates a fine, but patrons may not 
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realize this). Suggestions include posting library policies at the circulation desk, and including 
circulation instruction with other library instruction.  
Description of institution 
Bowling Green State University (BGSU) is a large, public, research university in Ohio. In 
an examination of active undergrads, we found that 65% had checked out at least one item since 
starting college. The library circulates the typical monographs, government documents, reserves, 
and periodicals as well as phone chargers, laptops, and other personal use equipment. Items from 
the main collection circulate for 21 days to undergraduates and have unlimited renewals, but 
students are required to present their books at the end of the semester. Equipment can be 
borrowed for a few hours to be used in the library.  
Patrons who do not return main collections items on time are charged $.25 per day 
overdue. Reserves and equipment are charged $.25 (umbrellas) to $7.50 (laptops) an hour. Items 
which are long overdue are charged a $36 processing fee per item and the cost of the item as 
advertised at a major retailer. In fiscal year 2016/17, the library circulated approximately 
190,000 items and generated around $60,000 in overdue and replacement fees. Of the items 
circulated, 7377 (4%) were fined. Patrons reduced their fine, by returning the material or 
appealing the charge, in 5% (n = 365) of cases. 
OhioLINK 
BGSU is also part of the OhioLINK consortium. Circulation through OhioLINK accounts 
for approximately 20% of our borrowing. Overdue and replacement charges for these items are 
set centrally and members are required to enforce them. To better understand how we charged 
patrons, we surveyed other OhioLINK institutions via the pcirc listserv. The goal of the survey 
was to determine how local library policies differed from OhioLINK fine policies, regarding 
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both OhioLINK loans and local items. We also wanted to determine how circulation staff 
members felt about current fine policies and whether there was a general openness to rethinking 
fines.  
 Sixty-nine people responded to the survey, from a mix of institution types that correspond 
roughly to those of OhioLINK members. Most respondents indicated that their local fines were 
smaller than those charged on OhioLINK items. 18% of libraries do not charge local daily fines 
at all, and an additional 32% of libraries do not charge local fines for faculty (thus, 50% of 
libraries do not charge local fines to faculty). For 61% of those libraries with daily local fines, it 
is less than the 50 cents charged for OhioLINK books.  
 We asked about how strictly they enforce fines. 59% of libraries “mostly” follow the 
OhioLINK policy, while 6% say that that they simply do not follow the policy. This means that 
only 1/3 of libraries enforce the current policy as written. 76% of libraries allow fine appeals 
(either for their own or for OhioLINK items) and of those, 30% reported that they grant more 
than half of the appeals they receive while 35% grant fewer than 10% of appeals, indicating a 
wide variation in leniency among institutions.  
Finally, we asked questions to determine attitudes toward fines. Two possible reasons 
were given for collecting fines: ensuring the book’s return and generating revenue. For 87% of 
institutions, getting the item back was more important than generating revenue. For 64% of that 
group, revenue was 10% or less of their library’s reason for fines. Only 13% said that revenue 
was important or more important than getting the item back. When asked whether they felt fines 
were effective, the most frequent response was a simple “Yes”. Participants at 45% of 
institutions we unsure or felt that fines were ineffective. Comments on the survey ranged from 
satisfaction with the high billing fee as a tool for getting items back; dissatisfaction with the idea 
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of a financial punishment which could be shrugged off by wealthier patrons and devastating to 
less wealthy patrons; and a sense that fines are not a strong enough incentive to change behavior.  
Methodology 
Participants 
To recruit students for this study we employed several methods but were unable to meet 
the 200 members we had planned on. The first method we used was to directly email students 
who fell within our parameters and invite them to a short session about the study. Potential 
participants would be treated to pizza and soft drinks while we talked about the study and signed 
them up. This method garnered us approximately 20 students. As we had set times it didn’t fit 
into student’s busy schedules. To make the sessions more accessible, we went to the second 
method of hanging up flyers, spreading word around campus through our student workers, 
talking about the study during class sessions with amenable professors, speaking at a student 
government meeting, and sitting at a table in the library with candy. During these sessions we 
were able to explain the study and sign up an additional 50 or so people. We had 79 participants 
in the study.  
We only included undergraduate students in this study. We requested that only 
sophomores, juniors, or seniors participate. The average number of years at BGSU of our 79 
participants was 2.94 and ranged from 1 to 7 based on the date their patron record was created. 
(Because students may have transferred to BGSU, or may have completed a number of class 
hours that doesn’t match the number of years they have been at BGSU, we used the patron 
record creation date as a standard.) Because we used a convenience sample to gather participants, 
more of our participants were library employees than would have been expected in a random 
sample. However, the majority of the participants were not library employees.  
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When students signed up for the study, they completed a questionnaire about their library 
behavior and their attitudes towards fines. Most students (44) said they checked out about 1-5 
books from the main stacks in a typical semester. Sixteen students indicated that they checked 
out more than 5 books in a semester, and eighteen indicated that they usually did not check out 
any books. Two-thirds of the participants indicated that they had never paid a library fine in the 
past, either because they never returned anything late or because they had never checked 
anything out at all. Only nine participants indicated that they had ever paid a fine on a book from 
the research collection in the past, which was the subject of this study.  
When asked whether they felt fines were beneficial overall, 68 out of our 79 participants 
said that they were. One student even suggested that fines should get “exponentially larger” the 
longer they are overdue as an additional incentive. When asked what usually prompts them to 
return a book, twenty-five students responded that avoiding fines is one of their reasons, more 
than gave any other reason. The second most common reason was simply that they were finished 
using it. Sixteen students indicated that an email from the library was their cue, either a courtesy 
notice or an overdue notice.  
Students’ responses on this survey should be taken with a grain of salt. When comparing 
students’ patron records with their self-reporting, some students would appear to be 
overestimating their past library use or misremembering their fine history. During the study 
period, only thirty of our participants checked out any books from the main stacks collection, 
fewer than the 61 students who reported that they typically check out at least a few books in a 
semester.  
At the end of the data gathering period, students were asked to complete another 
questionnaire, with different questions for members of the experimental and control groups. This 
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survey was completed online, and participation was required to be entered into a gift card 
drawing, but still fewer than half of the original participants completed it (thirteen control, 
twenty experimental). Students were asked whether participation in the study changed their 
borrowing habits and similar numbers of experimental (45%) and control (38%) participants said 
that it had. The experimental group participants reported that they kept books longer (4), checked 
out more books (4), and paid either more (3) or less (2) attention to their library accounts. People 
in the control group said that after hearing more about our fine policies, they checked out fewer 
books (1) or more books (1) and paid more attention to their library account and due dates (3). 
Because so few students completed this final survey, these numbers can’t be usefully generalized 
to what might happen if we were to remove daily fines.  
Comments shared on the final survey supported the research showing students appreciate 
the idea of fines, just not always when the fines are applied to them. Because college students are 
"broke," financial incentives should work, one said. One person in the control group said that 
they and others like them would never return books if there were no fines. On the other hand, one 
person in the experimental group said “While I did indeed turn in my books later, I still made 
sure to read them while they were checked out, take good care of them and then return them 
before an exaggeratedly long amount of time had passed. Doing this study made me wonder why 
such strict due date punishments even existed.”  
Procedure 
As students signed up for the study, we randomly assigned them to be in the control or 
experimental group. First we looked at their patron account and divided the number of checkouts 
on their account by the number of years they had attended BGSU to sort them into a low-, 
medium-, or high-use group. The grouping corresponded to an average number of checkouts per 
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year of zero (n = 20), 1-5 (n = 30), or more than 5 (n = 29). Then we drew a slip of paper from a 
supply of slips that was used only for that group. Slips were not returned to the supply once 
pulled. Students were then informed, either verbally or through email, of their group, and given a 
printed or emailed copy of what it meant to be in the control or the experimental group. Before 
they were assigned to a group, we also verbally explained to each student what the study was 
about and what fines would be waived for students in the experimental group. 
Every weekday from October 3, 2017, to May 5, 2018, we gathered data from each 
participant’s account about the items they had checked out. (A few days were missed due to 
illness or other unforeseen circumstances.) For the study we only examined items borrowed from 
the main stacks. We considered main stacks books to include anything from the main collection 
or the special collections that circulate books for the same three-week period as the main stacks 
books. Reserve books, technology such as phone chargers, and OhioLINK and ILL books were 
excluded. We exported the data to a spreadsheet which tracked the patron record number and 
information about each book including due date and checkout date. Each day we compared the 
list to the previous day’s list, noted any books which had been returned or renewed, and looked 
at the item record to confirm the day of the return. If an item had been renewed, the renewal date 
was considered both the return date for the initial checkout and the checkout date for a new 
checkout. As we continued to add participants to the study through February 2018, some 
participants had eight months of data while others had only about two months. Also, some 
students left BGSU at the end of the fall semester and so they were not eligible to check out 
books after Dec. 15, 2017.  
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Results 
To answer our questions, we ran as series of t-tests on the patron data. By grouping the 
data by patron, it allowed us to control for confounding variables.  
Do fines reduce how long an item is overdue? 
Over the course of the study 30 participants (fourteen control and sixteen experimental) 
checked out 180 items.  Each renewal was counted as a new use, which made a total of 292 uses 
of library material during the study period. On average, participants in the control group kept 
items around 17.21 days (SD = 6.58) before returning or renewing the material. The distribution 
for the control group was negatively skewed (-.65) and positively kurtotic (1.27). Most patrons 
kept the item around 30 days. The experimental group kept their items longer, averaging 20.98 
days (SD = 11.81) out. The distribution for the experimental group was positively skewed (2.03) 
and positively kurtotic (3.76) with most patrons keeping the item out in the same 30-day range. 
The kurtosis for the experimental group falls outside the normal range violating the assumption 
of normality for this group. On average the control group and the experimental group kept items 
for the same amount of time, t(29) = -1.06, p = .296, two-tailed. 
Table 1:  
Overview of borrowing 
Group Participants Checkouts Average Days used 
Average days under / 
over 
Both 30 292 (100%) 19.27 (SD = 9.84) -2.59 (SD = 9.71) 
Control 14 158 (54%) 17.21 (SD = 6.58) -4.57 (SD = 5.96) 
Experimental 16 134 (46%) 20.98 (SD = 11.81) -.97 (SD = 11.90) 
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The distribution for the control group was negatively skewed (-.65) and positively 
kurtotic (1.27) indicating a high percentage of items being returned just before they were due.  
For the experimental group the data was positively skewed (2.03) and positively kurtotic (3.76). 
So, most items were returned just before they were due with a long tail for the few patrons who 
returned items 30 days after they were due. Both skew and kurtosis were outside normal bounds 
for experimental items violating the assumption of normality. On average the control group 
returned their items 4.57 (SD = 5.96) days before it was due, and the experimental group 
returned items .97 (SD = 11.90) days before the item was due. This difference was not 
statistically significant, t(29) = -1.03, p = .312, two tailed. 
As indicated above, there is no statistical difference between the two groups. The 
relationship can be seen easily when examining the number of fines. Of the 292 items in this 
study 33 items (11%) were overdue2. Items checked out to the control group had the most fines, 
generating 18 overdue items for a total of $20.25 in fines. Items checked out to members of the 
experimental group generated fewer fines with only 15 items going overdue, however, the total 
was $70.50 indicating a longer time overdue. It should be noted that one patron in the 
experimental group was responsible for 8 (53%) of the fines and, more importantly, $58.25 
(83%) of the fine total for the experimental group. Another patron from the control group was 
responsible for 6 (33%) of the fines and $6.25 (31%) of the fine amount.  The fines for the 
control group were less severe than the experimental. The presence of major outliers in both 
groups skews the data. 
 
 
                                                 
2 BGSU library does not bill for fines under one dollar. While there were 33 "fines", only 22 (76%) would have been 
enforced.  
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Table 2:  
Fines 
Group Items overdue / use % # patrons fined Amount owed 
Both 33/292  11% 12 $90.75 
Control 18/158  11% 6 $20.25 
Experimental 15/134   11% 6 $70.50 
 
Do daily fines affect borrowing habits? 
We examined the effect on borrowing habits in two ways. The first was the number of 
items checked out. The distribution for the control group's number of checkouts prior to the 
study was positively skewed (2.07) and kurtotic (3.80) as most participants checked out 0 items. 
For the experimental group, the distribution was also positive on skew (1.87) and kurtosis 
(3.274) with a similar skew to 0 checkouts. Both groups violated normality on both skew and 
kurtosis. During the study the distribution change distinctly. Control skew (2.71) and kurtosis 
(9.90) were positive, and experimental was similarly positively skewed (3.42) and kurtotic 
(11.48). The jump in kurtosis could be attributed to the number of patrons who checked out zero 
items jumping to an additional 9 cases in the experimental group. When comparing the 
checkouts before and after, the control group checked out fewer books during the study (M = 
6.55, SD = 9.82) than their normal average (M = 8.86, SD = 13.39), however, this was not found 
to be significant t(38) = 1.15, p = .257, two tailed. The experimental group also found an 
insignificant increase in items checked out before (M = 10.59, SD = 23.89) and after (M = 9.09, 
SD = 11.67) the study, t(38) =  -.41, p = .684, two tailed. 
Next, we analyzed the average number of fines before and after the study. Simply put, 
both the control and experimental distributions for fines before and after the study were 
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positively skewed and kurtotic, with most participants having 0 fines. The control group received 
more fines (M = .55, SD = 1.13) than they did before (M = .51, SD = .83), but the that was not 
found to be significant, t(39) = -.19, p = .853, two tailed. The same held true for the experimental 
group who had an insignificant increase in fine after the study (M = .74, SD = 1.86) as compared 
to before (M = .53, SD = 1.27), t(38) = -.74, p = .412, two-tailed. 
Table 3:  
Skew and Kurtosis for fines before and after study 
 Before After 
 Skew Kurtosis Skew Kurtosis 
Control 1.74 2.16 2.33 5.61 
Experimental 3..6 11.54 2.72 6.36 
 
Conclusion 
We found that fines don't significantly change how long an item is overdue or the patron's 
borrowing habits. Even with significant outliers, most students returned their items before the 
due date. There is evidence to suggest that receiving the courtesy notice may be a more 
important factor in timely returns. Based on the average days used, patrons from both groups 
typically returned their items on the 19th day of the loan period, while courtesy notices are sent 
on the 18th day. Our study suggests that patrons borrow what they need and return it when they 
are done. The lack of change in borrowing habits also indicates that fines are not a deterrent to 
checking out library material. Our findings are in line with literature review which showed an 
increase in items returned overdue but no statistically significant change after removing fines   
The study was limited by the small sample size. While we had almost 100 participants, 
only 30 checked out items. This is more troublesome for the first research question, than the 
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second. Also, many of our participants were student employees. The effect of using library 
employees is likely to be small. Employees were divided evenly among the two groups and were 
the outliers in both. Even though the students knew the library rules better than their peers (if 
only due to exposure) some still brought their items back later. 
It should also be noted that the groups for participants were divided into those who had 
checked out 0 items, 1 to 5 items, and over 5 items. The grouping was created by pulling all 
active undergrads and their total number of check outs, then dividing total checkouts by years at 
the institution. Out of a possible 8820 students, 3067 (35%) have not checked out even a pair of 
headphones from the library. Paired with a general decline in checkouts we begin to wonder why 
we should punish our users. As we found in the literature review, some libraries have done away 
with fines as the labor to process charges is more than the revenue gained. When we surveyed 
Ohio library staff most respondents said that the timely return of materials was a more important 
reason to charge fines than earning revenue for the library, but the bottom line is that our data do 
not show that fines cause materials to be returned more quickly.   
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